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Economic Aspects of Medical Negligence in
the Context of the National Health Service

in Britain*
Stephen L. Heasell**
INTRODUCTION

It is conceivable that the United Kingdom (U.K.) will come to
rely and spend heavily on litigation in cases of harm to patients
from health services, resembling the experience of the United
States (U.S.). That could not have been said with any conviction
until the 1980s, or even later. How do recent changes to the
National Health Service (NHS) affect an economic analysis of
issues associated with medical negligence litigation? An embryonic quasi market in health services in Britain as well as an increase in business practices previously regarded as distinctive of
the private sector make an inquiry based on conventional notions of an idealized market more relevant than before. There
has been a longstanding expectation that litigation will be more
prominent in the U.S. than in the U.K., partly because health
services in the U.K. are less market orientated than they are in
the U.S. That expectation now deserves more scrutiny than it
received when the NHS was undeniably a monolithic, bureaucratic, public-sector organisation. Are the conclusions suggested
by a standard economic analysis of the health services market in
the U.K. as it was during the 1980s confirmed or invalidated by
what has happened since then?
One theme that undoubtedly remains important, as ever, is
that of relevant empirical evidence that is both reliable and
readily available. Such evidence relating to the issue of medical
litigation in the U.K. has been sparse indeed, both for individual
decision makers and for any who would attempt a disinterested
* This article is based upon Professor Heasell's speech delivered at the Fourth
Annual Comparative Health Law Conference, "Medical Malpractice: A Comparative
Analysis," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for
Health Law in October of 1993.
** Stephen L. Heasell is a Senior Lecturer in Economics at The NottinghamTrent University in Nottingham, U.K. He received his Bachelor of Arts in Economics
with Honors.
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analysis of overall resource allocation.1 There are some grounds
for hope that recent changes will prompt improvements in this
regard, although doubts persist about their extent. Exclusive,
rather than shared, access to information may seem all the more
valuable in an increasingly fragmented health service system.
This article begins by outlining a standard economic analysis
of medical malpractice litigation as it was in the U.K. before
1990. It then identifies key changes to the NHS since 1990 and
places them in the context of an experiment in quasi markets.
The standard economic analysis is then reconsidered given the
changes in health services, and some tentative predictions are
suggested. This particular comparison over time is offered as
one contribution to the search for more efficient, responsive,
and equitable resource allocation for health care in Britain and
North America.
I.

AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MEDICAL LITIGATION

A conventional economic analysis of medical negligence litigation focuses on overall objectives for resource allocation, especially efficiency, and the role of material incentives (alongside
others) in shaping decisions and their outcomes. Economists
commonly define improvements in efficiency in any particular
context as changes in resource allocation that enable at least one
individual to feel better off without necessarily leaving anyone
else feeling worse off. For example, cutting the cost of providing
particular health services (thus enabling resources to be used in
other valuable ways) would qualify as an improvement in efficiency only if the value of benefits, as perceived by the individuals receiving the service, is not also cut by so great an extent;
similarly, increases in the value of benefits from a service would
qualify only if costs (alternative benefits foregone) did not rise
by so great an extent. Additional cuts in costs or increases in
benefit might be supported on other grounds, such as equity or
fairness in some form, but not on grounds of efficiency according to this definition. Such an analysis, using a textbook market
for comparative purposes and applied to the system of medical
1. As identified by Robert Dingwall et al. throughout their book MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (Oxford: Centre for Socio-Legal Studies,
1991). For an example, see page 11.
2. For example, since the Crown indemnity reforms of 1990, local health authorities must now routinely report some relevant data to the Department of Health.
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negligence litigation as it operated in the U.K. during the 1980s,
reveals at least three characteristics.
First, there was no relationship between the professional indemnity insurance premiums actually paid by individual doctors
(given various government subsidies) and their experience of
negligence claims against them. Doctors, though far outnumbered by nurses and other categories of employees within the
NHS, clearly exert a leading influence on resource allocation decisions and their outcomes. A closer relationship between insurance rates and negligence claims could efficiently deter
substandard practice if this were coupled with an appropriate
version of the courts' current test of weighing an individual doctor's practice against standards to be expected of relevant peers.
Litigation itself would then deter only substandard and negligent practice within any service and would not discourage doctors from performing services where the risk of genuine medical
error or accident is high. Doctors would have better information about the costs incurred by patients who suffer harm and
would have a material incentive to take those costs into account
when making practice decisions.
Second, the analysis suggests that court awards during the
1980s did not accurately reflect the expected losses that patients
might face as a consequence of medical negligence. The availability of remedies and government payments to patients who
suffered injury limited the awards. Both the first and second
characteristics reduced the short-term impact of any doctor's
medical negligence on their own pockets. According to the
standard economic analysis, this impaired the information carried by price, which might otherwise lead health service providers and administrators to maintain an optimal overall balance in
allocating resources, weighing the need to provide medical services against the need to avoid medical error and harm to
patients.
Third, such an economic inquiry would also question the costs
associated with the system of medical negligence litigation, apart
from any sums paid as compensation, particularly the costs that
confront those individuals contemplating whether or not to prepare a claim. At least some of these other costs are known in
shorthand as "transaction costs." They could be high enough to
deter entry into the market for relevant legal services, hence impairing the information about the true costs of medical harm
that might otherwise be conveyed by market price. The ecoPublished by LAW eCommons, 1994
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nomic inquiry would also recognise, however, that the causes of
those transaction costs may contribute to the deterrence of medical error.3 For example, any attempt to relate indemnity premia
closely to the claims prospects of individual doctors or health
care organisations, which might optimally deter error by those
individuals by confronting them with cost consequences of any
error, would itself incur costs in establishing the appropriate
levels of premia. The collection of data required to relate indemnity premiums to the size or frequency of claims with any
precision, as advocated by economists, would incur one more set
of costs to be weighed against the benefits expected from the
exercise. At some point the costs of achieving more precision
are likely to outweigh the expected benefits.
That list of characteristics in the economic assessment might
be supplemented by considering whether there can be compatibility in the market between medical negligence litigation and
existing arrangements for allocating resources with regard to
other causes of injury or disability. These arrangements include
essentially no-fault assumptions and social welfare payments.4
The analysis of compatibility also involves the problem of constraints considered immovable in one aspect of the health services market that may impinge on the efficiency of resource
allocation elsewhere and overall in the market.
Popular commitment or rhetoric expressing notions of fairness, which have always been associated with the NHS, would
stir somewhat, in this particular context, the conventionally
muted attention to questions of equity in an economic analysis,
by comparison with those of efficiency. The aspiration may be
that all individuals in equal need of health care should receive
equally adequate care if it is technically possible to provide it;
greater need should imply more care. Problems arise in reaching a consensus on the precise understanding of equity and reconciling in practice any such formulation with the constraint of
scarce resources. Economists might suggest that any equitable
objective adopted might be achieved more cost effectively if the
message sent by court awards for medical negligence cases were
3. See, e.g., Roger Bowles & Philip Jones, Medical Negligence and Resource Allocation in the NHS, 24 Soc. POL. & ADMIN. 39, 47-48 (1990).
4. Dingwall et al., supra note 1, at 75-76 (clearly regretting that commentators
have tended to reflect separate agendas for each of these matters).
5. For a discussion of relevant types of these possible problems, see Stephen Williams, Second Best: The Soft Underbelly of Deterrence Theory in Tort, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 932 (1993).
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not suppressed and distorted by the manner in which those
awards are made. Court decisions about whether to make an
award in a particular case, or how much it is to be, have been
affected by considering what other welfare benefits are available
to the patient in his or her current circumstances and what form
these alternatives take (universal or means test, flat rate or variable rate, statutory or discretionary, etc.). Consequently, court
awards typically do not reflect the full expected cost of the incident that gave rise to the claim.
Of course, even mainstream versions of economic analysis
could be applied with a different emphasis. For example, formal
study of the negotiating and contracting behaviour of various
economic actors has become increasingly popular since the
1980s. There is plenty of scope for this analysis in the complex
relationships between patients and agents, including health service and legal professionals, employed to act on their behalf.
The transmission and assimilation of information relevant for
decision making remain key themes in that type of study.
In summary, mainstream economists in the 1980s would have
highlighted divergences between the practice of medicine at that
time and a textbook market for medical services. Many strands
in the implied criticism of current practice refer to nonmarket or
noncompetitive elements in resource allocation as they affected
health services in the U.K. at that time. The spectre of high
transaction costs, however, requires even conventionally trained
market economists to make some heretical adjustments to the
system, such as government subsidies to improve patient access
to competent legal advice or alternatives to litigation such as
some form of no-fault scheme.
Economic assessment of medical litigation in the 1980s was
rare and limited. The health service context was one where public ownership, finance, and provision combined to mightily outweigh the private sector, with bureaucratic resource allocation
still largely dominating market allocation for health services and
compensation for injury. The apparently greater prominence in
the United States of medical malpractice litigation and its cost
has always been ascribed in part to the differently mixed health
economies and the different legal systems in the two countries.6
However, the resource allocation mechanisms for delivering
health services (and other welfare services) in the U.K. have be6. See
1992).

MARGARET BRAZIER, MEDICINE, PATIENTS AND THE LAW
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gun to change and have done so more dramatically since 1990.
Increasingly, the health service system in the U.K. is shaped by
quasi-market forces rather than by bureaucracies.
II.

CHANGES TO THE

NHS

FOR THE

1990s

In 1990, Parliament formally announced two changes to the
NHS. In January of that year, a new form of Crown indemnity
regarding the work of doctors and dentists within the NHS established that the organisation, not the practitioners, would be
liable for any court-awarded compensation payments for medical negligence. This replaced the curious dual liability that had
existed for doctors but never for other NHS employees (a legacy
of the political origins of the NHS). June of 1990 saw the passing of the National Health Service and Community Care Act,
which confirmed a government intention to establish distinct responsibilities for purchasing and providing NHS services on behalf of patients. 7 Both of these announcements, but most clearly
the purchaser-provider initiative, can be recognised as continuing the encouragement and development through the 1980s of
business practices previously more associated with the private
sector, where cost sensitivity, if not price sensitivity, played an
increasingly important role. Parallel developments took place
throughout much of the existing public-sector community, including the education and central government services
communities.
It would have surprised no one that these initiatives took
place under strong leadership by Conservative rather than Labour governments. Prime Minister Thatcher's decision to restrain radical reforms of this kind to the extent she did merely
affirms that the NHS inspires more popular and political resistance to the further encroachment of a market-orientated allocation of resources than do other public-sector institutions.
One consequence of the changes that emerged is the increased recognition in the U.K. that a standard economic approach might be relevant to the analysis of medical negligence
litigation or the NHS itself. The long-term popular experience
of a health service system well insulated from the influence of
market prices negotiated between individual buyers and sellers,
apparently by the collective choice of the nation, did not square
7.

An outline of these and allied reforms was expressed in a BRITISH DEPART-

MENT OF HEALTH, WORKING FOR PATIENTS (White Paper) (CM555,

London:

HMSO, Jan. 1989).
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with the use of textbook markets as a benchmark against which
current practices or plausible reforms were to be explained and
assessed. Markets had apparently been rejected on various
grounds as the main vehicle for allocating health care resources.
Emphasis on the role of litigation (and hence market price) in
providing information relevant to the optimum allocation of resources, as distinct from its incentive and burdens, might also
have sounded strange to people in Britain. By 1991, however,
the semblance of a sizeable quasi market8 in NHS services was
emerging, and even those resisting or sceptical about its development had to recognise it as such.
III.

THE PURCHASER-PROVIDER INNOVATIONS

Since 1991, in accordance with the ideas outlined in Working
for Patients,9 the Department of Health has designated a
number of applicants from among existing NHS hospitals and
units as independent NHS Trust providers of services. By April
1994, there will almost certainly be about four hundred such
Trusts in England, encompassing approximately ninety-five percent of all English hospitals. These Trusts, many but not all of
them general acute-services hospitals, face different and generally less restrictive government constraints, when compared with
traditional providers, on how they are to uphold NHS principles
and policies. In particular, they are accountable to central,
rather than local, NHS bureaucracies. Providers that remain
subject to local NHS administration or management, by choice
or because ineligible for Trust status, found themselves potentially in competition with the Trusts as well as a growing array of
institutions newly designated as purchasers of NHS services.
Routine purchase of most NHS services had not been a feature of the health care institution prior to 1991. Any reference
to a purchasing function within the NHS had been confined to
the acquisition of inputs from which NHS services were generated, not to the services themselves. Since 1991, responsibilities
for explicitly purchasing access to services on behalf of defined
patient populations were assigned to all District Health Authori-

8.

A term apparently first used in a comparable context in

MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:

9.

BRITISH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
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ties (DHAs)' 0 and offered to some General Practices (GPs), the
family doctor service. Both the GPs and the DHAs are types of
organisations that had provided, administered, or managed
some such services until then and would continue to do so.
These purchasers are allocated limited public funds on a prospective basis, in various ways, so that they can negotiate contracts with providers within or beyond the NHS. The dual
responsibilities of DHAs as purchasers and providers of contracted services currently imply unusual formal divisions within
these organisations. However, these apparent anomalies will be
reduced if, as expected, more providers successively attain the
status of independent NHS Trust.
Together, these new arrangements became known, imprecisely, as the internal market. The term stresses the contracts
and prices that were to be established for NHS services between
different NHS institutions. In some ways, the reforms facilitated
the integration of the private and NHS sectors in health care,
although the private sector remains comparatively limited, as do
prospects for direct competition between purchasers, or providers, of both sectors. Individual patients or their private agents
still largely face a market price of zero at the point of use for
NHS services purchased on their behalf by DHAs or GPs.
Some user charges, which were set administratively rather than
emerging as market prices, have become more prominent since
1990, continuing trends familiar in the 1980s. However, health
care services are still to be financed mainly by prospective allocation from general taxes, channelled through the NHS. The superficial prominence of greater attempts by local NHS managers
to generate supplementary revenue through private enterprise
yields small sums when compared with these enormous public
inflows. Distributions of any surplus revenue as profit within
NHS organisations remains formally forbidden: it is instead to
be directed to improve local health services for patients.
Trusts and directly managed NHS providers are to derive
their income mainly by contracting with NHS purchasers, with
each other, or with the private sector. The amount of public
funding for purchasers is intended to be determined largely on
the basis of capitation (resident population in the case of local
10. There were about 165 DHAs in England by April 1993, following some restructuring, each of them having a revenue budget for the year 1993/94 of between

£35 million and £350 million.

THE INSTrrUTE OF HEALTH SERVICE MANAGEMENT,

THE HOSPITALS AND HEALTH SERVICES YEARBOOK,
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DHAs; practice lists for GPs), weighted by such factors as the
age of the population, the incidence of ill health, and the local
cost of providing health care. Some public payments linked to
particular items of service will also be offered, although in practice, to date, past levels of expenditure have still been used to
determine present and future funding.
Fund-holding GPs, as they are known, get their public funds
from a slice of the allocations channelled to local health authorities, who are to fund the GPs before using the money for other
purposes. The share of health authority allocations devoted to
fund-holding GPs is destined to grow as more GPs are designated as fund holders. DHAs remain responsible for a large
proportion of purchases on behalf of fund-holding GPs, generally for the more essential and costly items. Thus, the exposure
of fund holders to possible failure and exhaustion of their resources, with smaller organisations especially at risk, is reduced.
DHAs also continue to purchase all services they deem necessary for patients of those GPs that have not become fund holders, as yet a clear majority.
Since 1984, the central government has influenced important
precursors, in terms of business orientation, to the 1990 reforms.
These included the introduction of a general management function to the NHS, specific budget responsibilities, and influential
appointees from the private sector. There was also a series of
initiatives (such as requirements that private contractors be allowed to supply particular NHS inputs) that forced NHS decision makers to seek "value for money" and to to so in particular
ways; these initiatives were designed to influence any who were
unaware of the possibility of contracting with private suppliers
or who were unwilling to vigorously pursue such possibilities.
By 1991, commentators were convinced of a shift in cultural balance within the health care system from a professional orientation to a businesslike one, which was followed by the
introduction of structures that encouraged a new contract culture to develop. Previously, reliance had been placed to a
greater extent on professional trust.11
It would be a great exaggeration to claim that the purchaserprovider reforms of 1990 have resulted in a health care system
where resource allocation is dominated by the influence of market prices negotiated between many individual buyers and sellers. The reforms themselves have done comparatively little to
11.

See, e.g.,

IAN HOLLIDAY, THE
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shake the NHS monolith, and genuine pressure to compete to
make services available to patients remains limited. NHS purchasers and providers, such as individual big-city hospitals (especially in London and Birmingham) have begun to test the
possibility of exit from the market, a development that coincides
with another aspect of health policy, a shift in balance from hospital to community care.
The impact of the quasi market on the market presence of
other existing types of health care institutions or individual
types of service is not yet clear. The latter will depend heavily
on the quality of information newly generated regarding patient
need, cost, and quality of service. DHAs are virtually local monopsony 12 purchasers of services on behalf of up to a million
captive patients, a potential influence on the market that is compounded where DHAs have formed purchasing consortia
among themselves in the name of economy or better planning.
The relationship between DHAs and NHS providers individually or as a whole is virtually that of a bilateral monopoly, especially in a local context. These restrictions on a purchaser's
ability to choose services compound restrictions on the patients,
who must rely on the purchaser to act as an agent on their behalf. In addition, large start-up costs for hospitals (sunk costs)
seem to offer incumbent NHS providers a market advantage
over potential new entrants, at least for a wide range of general
acute services. There is as yet no market in the ownership or
management of existing NHS institutions.
The formal delineation of separate purchasers and providers
for the first time, together with tighter budgetary discipline,
might be expected to increase explicit market-sensitive information. Contract price (asked, offered, or agreed) is one such type
of information. It, in turn, encourages the search for more details regarding cost, volume, or quality of services. The expected
benefits of acquiring extra information, however, will be
weighed against its expected costs. Similarly, the usefulness of
explicit performance indicators in planning will be judged partly
by whether they are sensitive enough to the fundamental aims
of decision makers. Where aims are unclear, intangible, or in
conflict, as in the NHS, investment in explicit indicators may be
restricted or misdirected. Individual players in the internal market will be tempted to focus on their own private benefits and
12. A monopsony is a market situation where one buyer exists for services provided by a number of sellers.
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/15
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costs of extra information, which will diminish their willingness
to disseminate the information widely and increase attempts to
free-ride by using data produced by others. Health care is not
so perfect a market that reliance on privately generated information is guaranteed to yield efficient or equitable overall resource allocation. Rather, the quasi market in the U.K. is
complex, motivated by nonprofit objectives and populated by
individuals who vary radically in their opportunities to process
relevant personal or technical information.
Incentives to generate and disseminate good, market-related
information systematically, including details on quality that
would interest patients, may thus be diminished, especially considering the high costs of doing so within strictly limited budgets
and given the limited information bases from before 1991. The
development of comparative medical audits as a contribution towards quality assurance was included as a commitment in the
White Paper, Working for Patients.3 How enthusiastically it
progresses among cost-constrained health authorities or professional associations and how readily it influences the allocation of
resources is open to doubt. New but weak substitutes for the
patient's power to exit from the market or voice concerns include the institution by government of the Patient's Charter of
limited guarantees concerning waiting times and other aspects
of health services. Where competitive pressures are weak but
budgetary constraints are strict, as seems to be the case with
DHA purchasers, the interests of individuals currently seeking
services may suffer when compared with those of the NHS, its
professionals, or other taxpayers.
Incentives to pursue patient concerns including questions of
quality could be a little stronger among fund-holding GPs,
whose practice lists, containing as few as 7,000 patients, may attract capitation payments. The ability of patients to transfer between GPs has been made formally easier in recent years. GPs
may now advertise to some extent and in fact are obliged to
display certain information about the services they offer. The
relatively small size of GP resources, when compared with those
of DHAs and some providers, suggests that GPs suffer a competitive disadvantage in the quasi market. To date, however,
some DHAs have committed many of their resources early in
the financial year to block contracts that allow them access to
services on a scale that proves eventually to be more than is
13.

BRITISH DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
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needed. Fund-holding GPs have necessarily managed resources
on a smaller scale and specified their contract requirements
more conservatively. As a consequence, some of them have
been able to buy access to limited numbers of hospital places for
their patients towards the end of the financial year at a time
when DHAs no longer have the uncommitted resources left to
do so.
Optimists for market allocation claim that markets, unlike bureaucracies, have in-built mechanisms that enable them to adjust
efficiently to changes in their context. It may be that the quasi
market in health services in the U.K. will undergo a similar adjustment, but it is still too soon to judge. For example, we can
confidently expect that DHA activities will be further displaced
by the new fund holders and Trusts. However, the outcomes
will depend partly on the structures put in place at the outset
and whether definitions of respective rights and responsibilities
are clear. Medical litigation is regarded as one possible way to
define and enforce relevant rights in the name of market efficiency. It is not clear that the initial purchaser-provider reforms
will have much overall impact on medical negligence litigation
as a deterrent against poor standards of service, although tighter
budgetary discipline within the NHS may tend to increase the
patient's need to have ready access to an effective system.
IV.

CHANGES TO CROWN INDEMNITY

The change in relationships between health service organisations that arose as a result of the purchaser-provider innovations
affects the distribution of responsibilities established by the almost contemporaneous reform of Crown indemnity in respect of
liability for medical error in the delivery of NHS services.
Under the revised liability scheme, only the NHS is liable for
medical errors; under the former scheme the physician faced potential liability as well. The Department of Health adopted this
change from among a range of alternatives designed to meet
Department concerns about the escalating costs of subsidising
doctors' professional indemnity subscriptions to the medical defence organisations (MDOs). In the late 1980s, the NHS had
borne much of the burden of these subscriptions (actually the
general taxpayer) either by direct subsidy or through the effect
the rates had on the formulae used to decide the levels of doctors' remuneration. Claims that the administrative costs of litigation be successfully contained by simply reallocating liability
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/15
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from doctors (and MDOs) to health service organisations were
treated sceptically beyond the Department.1 4 However, the indemnity reforms clearly could be seen as consistent with the
more general shift from a predominantly professional or clinician culture to one in which businesslike management might
hold increased sway. Litigation costs could change if responsibilities were exercised according to a different balance of priorities rather than by the elimination of any particular category of
transaction costs.
The trend in MDO subscription rates before and after the
shift in liablity illustrates the large effect doctors' personal liability had on their subscription rate when compared with other
services provided by these organisations. The main rate for 1988
reached over £1000 per individual in cash terms, following several large annual percentage increases. 15 In 1990, by contrast,
rates dropped to £160 or less (although the amount of non-NHS
work undertaken by a doctor would raise the sum payable). 6
In effect, the Crown indemnity reforms removed most MDO
subscriptions for NHS doctors as a set of price information that
might influence the allocation of resources between providing
medical services and avoiding medical error. However, they did
little to alter directly the relative burdens of liability between
doctors and the NHS, given the pre-existing NHS subsidies. The
value of MDO subscriptions as price information was likely to
be limited in practice. The Department of Health, if not the
MDOs, continued to resist higher rates for those doctors expected to give rise to higher levels of litigation. There were
fears of greater problems, including cost, in recruiting and retaining doctors for high-risk specialties, which could be seen as a
threat to the broad aspiration that NHS services be comprehensive. Any vagaries of the existing system of negligence litigation
in applying the test of individual practice against the standards
expected of relevant peers would reinforce the fears among
those who tend to be risk averse.
The Crown indemnity reforms have also rendered the NHS as
a whole effectively subject to self-insurance. The NHS is prevented from seeking contributions from individual doctors or
14. See, e.g., Margaret Brazier, NHS Indemnity: The Implicationsfor Medical Litigation, PROF. NEGL., June 1990, at 88.
15. See Paul Fenn & Robert Dingwall, Medical Negligence and Crown Indemnity
in HEALTH CARE U.K. 1989 39, 41 (Anthony Harrison & John Gretton eds., 1989).
16. See Brazier, supra note 14, at 90.
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other employees for costs arising from its own liability for incidents occurring on its premises, although contributions can be
sought from family doctors and others involved in non-NHS
work. Therefore, the NHS has a greater incentive to manage
the risks of error and litigation actively, which includes persuading individual doctors to comply with the strategies developed
by budget-constrained managers.
Formal responsibility within the NHS for dealing with particular claims of negligence has been decentralized since 1990. It
now rests largely with individual local provider units, either
Trusts or the so-called directly managed units attached to
DHAs, in which the relevant incident took place. Furthermore,
those units managed by a DHA are instructed to make liability
17
payments from the budget of the clinical specialties involved.
More localised responsibility and stricter financial controls suggest that the role of disciplinary procedures and of medical audit
will assume a potentially greater prominence, depending on how
strong the traditionally powerful professional defence of clinical
autonomy remains. A compromise on autonomy could increase
or expose the temptation to adjust one's clinical practice specifically to temper fear of litigation. The prospect for the medical
profession is one of patients bringing claims against them, even
though they are covered by NHS indemnity, and NHS business
managers strictly controlling their activities. That might seem to
them a nightmare combination of the pain of litigation with an
inquisitorial no-fault scheme, which they had striven for years to
avoid.
There is speculation, without much tangible evidence as yet,
that doctors in the U.K., anticipating that the costs of litigation
will escalate, are practising "defensive medicine"-that is, they
practice in a way that restricts exposure to litigation rather than
one that promotes the net benefits to patients when the two
aims conflict. The issue is complicated by uncertainty about distinctions between "defensive medicine" and properly careful
medicine, especially if actual practice is subject to more open
scrutiny than has been the case without explicit agreement
about what constitutes the limits of appropriate practice. Individual doctors may sense a greater difficulty in adhering to what
the profession regards as established standards. Their professional influence on the allocation of resources for health care
17.
16.
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may be challenged by the business managers of NHS providers
or agents representing patients and other interests.
The small size of individual NHS provider units, and even
DHAs, makes possibly wild swings in negligence claims from
time to time particularly difficult to manage effectively. The institution of loans from the Department of Health (for Trusts)
and from DHAs (for other NHS units) only mildly serves to
shift the risks from individual providers. The loans bear interest, and applications can be made only in particular cases (some
a legacy from pre-1990 arrangements) and only after the provider has exhausted a fixed amount of their current budget to
meet the cost of negligence liability. A group of Trusts (or other
providers), all with similar prospects, then, would see attractions
in pooling the resources set aside by each of them to meet the
cost of claims,18 evening out unpredictable swings in payments.
The transaction costs of arranging the pools and the loss of deterrent to individual error could be considerable, however, unless the mutual pool is managed with the sophistication, if not
the profit objective, of a commercial insurance fund. 19 The expert contribution of the three sizeable, experienced medical defence organisations to managing risks associated with medical
negligence litigation, substantially in cooperation with NHS authorities, has been weakened by the decline of most indemnity
subscriptions for individual doctors in 1990. By comparison, any
contribution of MDOs, if employed as agencies on a piecemeal
basis by the smaller, less experienced constituent parts of the
NHS empire, would be compromised or amended by the new,
fragmented approach and, possibly, by the newly contractual nature of the relationship between them as organisations with different agendas.
As Trusts, which are managed independently of DHAs, increase in number, they will complicate further the efficient management of liability across the NHS as a whole. The small size
of Trusts and their short history to date means that even if NHS
regulations permitted them to seek commercial insurance for
medical negligence litigation, it may not be affordable given the
unpredictability of claims against them. The Trusts could, instead, oblige the doctors they employ to pay their own indemnity subscriptions to MDOs, echoing NHS arrangements prior
18.

Id.
See Roger Bowles & Philip Jones, Better Safe than Sorry, HEALTH SERV. J.,
Mar. 21, 1991, at 18-19.
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to 1990. That, though, might raise the cost of employing Trust
doctors to a rate higher than that of their rival non-Trust providers. If left largely self-insured, Trusts may be persuaded to avoid
providing health care services where risks of litigation seem
high, leaving these services to be performed by other providers
or not at all, to the possible detriment of patients.
The response of NHS providers to their potential liability
under the reformed Crown indemnity will be complicated by
their equally new relationships with purchasers. The willingness
of GPs to act with their patients to bring claims for negligence
against a doctor, and hence against a provider, will depend
partly on the generosity of their capitation payment rates and
the competitiveness of the internal market. The fewer their feasible alternative sources of contract services, the greater their
need will be, as agents for the patient, to resort to litigation as a
possible sanction against poor quality; however, they will also
need to preserve a working relationship with the particular provider. The strongly adversarial nature of the legal system in
England may be unhelpful in this regard. In addition, it should
be noted that disputes arising from contracts between NHS purchasers and NHS providers are, for the present, to be settled
within the health service and are not subject to contract law.
Underlying this all, perhaps, is the fact that there remains no
direct financial relation between NHS patient and NHS
purchasing agent, let alone between patient and doctor or
provider.
The willingness of DHAs to ally themselves with individual
patients for purposes of negligence litigation seems still more in
doubt, even if the administrative structures or "Chinese walls"
that separate their roles as purchasers and as managers of some
NHS providers are preserved effectively. Both of these roles
will diminish as GPs continue to become fund holders and as
more parts of the NHS become independent Trusts, leaving the
authorities with less influence on the market. They are likely,
nevertheless, to remain remote from individual patients when
compared with GPs and perhaps even with hospital doctors.
Though newly charged with the responsibility to identify the
health care needs of their resident population, on which they
base their purchasing requirements and strategy, their incentives
to do so could be threatened substantially by the cost of acquiring and disseminating that information assiduously and sensitively on behalf of such a large and remote set of people. In the
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol3/iss1/15

16

1994]

Heasell: Economic Aspects of Medical Negligence in the Context of the Nati

Economic Aspects of Medical Negligence

initial stages of the purchaser-provider reforms, more systematic
effort clearly went into establishing the contracting system, without which the market could not operate at all, than into an information-generating process on behalf of patients.
Any help that purchasers offer to patients considering medical
negligence litigation could well have some impact on outcomes,
including court awards, by offsetting slightly the formidable constraints on most potential plaintiffs' access and influence. (This
will be so particularly until individual providers have acquired
more of the expertise required to avoid or to win cases.) The
postreform semi-detachment of doctors' MDOs from the management of incidents involving the NHS could shift the imbalance of effective representation a little in favour of the patient.
The health authority's limited expertise in preparing a case
would raise the expected cost of pursuing it successfully through
the courts, thereby increasing the chance for an agreed settlement, especially if the explicit defence of a doctor's reputation is
less of a priority for the health authorities than for the MDOs.
There remains, however, the large problem of providers having
more information about the quality of services than do patients,
especially on technical matters. Even strong purchasers facing
smaller providers may be able to redress the imbalance, but only
if they are willing and able to spend considerable amounts of
money and resources on contract specification and monitoring.
V.

THE INFLUENCE OF WELFARE AND LEGAL SYSTEMS

Changes in the eligibility of patients for various subsidies affect trends in court awards, prior settlements, and transaction
costs more so than do the NHS innovations since 1990 and their
resulting implications for the law and the market for legal expertise. The practical ability of the legal system to address liability
for injury provides information that may serve to increase the
predictability of events, thus reducing the overall cost of health
services. The distribution of health care costs and the cost of the
legal system, which restrain them, may be modified by subsidy.
Central government continues its earnest scrutiny of welfare
payments generally, including legal aid for plaintiffs, with a view
toward containing public expenditure as a proportion of national income while existing commitments increase. A generalised attempt to curb widespread eligibilities in order to preserve
levels of subsidy for those with greatest financial need would
especially affect the legal aid scheme, to which many people
Published by LAW eCommons, 1994
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wishing to pursue a claim currently apply. The more varied and
extensive welfare payments available in the U.K. have been offered as one reason why awards for negligence tend to be lower
than in the U.S.20 The expected financial loss to patients in the
U.K. as a result of negligence may be genuinely lower than it is
in the States. If so, then courts in the U.K. may substitute
higher awards in place of any reductions in these government
subsidies. Any erosion of access to free NHS services, which
would result in additional costs to patients who seek remedial
care for a negligently caused injury, might also be assimilated
within the level of awards made. The alacrity with which judges
will encourage such adjustments as these might depend on
whether the undue deference allegedly given to the interests of
doctors as professionals, compared with that given patients,2'
continues now that the impact of litigation on doctors has been
somewhat deflected by NHS liability.
The undoubted influence of government subsidies could be
dangerous if those with influence in or on the NHS believe that
their own participation in the recent institutional changes has
little effect on the quality of services provided. The belief could
further encourage the traditional U.K. demand that subsidies to
patients be prioritised indefinitely, without specifying what alternative uses of resources would thereby be foregone (the opportunity costs). The necessary search for improvements in the
efficient delivery of high-quality services within the NHS might
be neglected as well.
VI. A TENTATIVE CONCLUSION
One conclusion suggested by this article is that it would be a
mistake to dwell exclusively on the recent structural or cultural

changes to the NHS, relevant though they are, in attempting to
predict prospects for litigation. This is in part because sizeable,
complex, and often controversial innovations within the quasi-

market experiment continue to challenge a popularly cherished
institution in what is still a very mixed economy of health. Pressures on public sector budgets in general will be relentless. The
pressures may be attributable to an increasingly dependent population or to the continuation of governmental attempts to reduce the share of public expenditure in national income, but it

seems certain that they will substantially affect reliance and
20.
21.

See, e.g., Dingwall, supra note 1, at 32.
A view confidently expressed in BRAZIER, supra note 6, at 71-72.
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spending on potential or actual litigation. One gloomy possibility facing individuals is that as alternative remedies are restricted, requiring them to rely increasingly on access to
litigation to deter and compensate for medical harm, access to
adequate legal services will become financially further out of
reach.

VII.

A

FINAL NOTE ABOUT INFORMATION

The panoply of changes to the NHS since 1990 put a premium
on good information relevant to the increasingly distinctive and
constrained choices faced by players in the health service quasi
market. We can expect various piecemeal efforts throughout
the quasi market or on its fringes to acquire and use such information. We can also expect some defensiveness in supplying
and disseminating it. Much of the relevant effort can be regarded as an investment in research output, where outcomes, if
any, benefit future rather than current patients. These expected
benefits are vulnerable to being ignored or underrepresented if
decision making and budgets are closely tied to a proliferation
of separate current stakeholders, even if many of them are NHS
organisations. There is a broad interest in efficiently and equitably balancing the provision of services that promote good health
with the avoidance of occasional error or malpractice that results in harm to patients. In the U.K., this balancing seems to
require renewed attention to the availability of explicit information from those whose responsibilities span wider than an individual purchaser or provider budget.
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